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THE RIGHT OF THE LESSEE TO POOL THE MINERAL
INTEREST OF THE LESSOR BEFORE AND AFTER
THE EXPIRATION OF THE PRIMARY TERM
In the past generation the development of oil and gas reservoirs has changed from that of uncoordinated individual effort
restricted by horizontal property lines to a coordinated system of
development which is based upon the particular characteristics of
the subterranean structure under development. This coordinated
development of an oil or gas reservoir is called a unit operation.
The basic reason for this type of development is that it tends to
allow the maximum amount of recovery for the minimum expense.
For the most effective unit operation, the developer needs to
have complete freedom of movement in order to drill into the
most select parts of an underground reservoir .Unfortunately,
vertical ownership lines do not usually conform with the irregular
shape of an underground oil or gas reservoir. Therefore, the developer must secure permission to conduct a unit operation from
all the landowners who own a part of the reservoir. This is often
difficult to do because a basic rule of oil and gas law is that the
landowner receives a full royalty in the minerals obtained from
a hole bottomed on his land. This means that if the landowner
consents to having his land included in a unit, he will not derive
the full benefit from a well drilled upon his own property, but
must share some of the royalty with other landowners in the unit.
For this reason, a new body of law has grown up which deals with
the rights of parties to conduct and participate in unit operations.
The problem to be dealt with by this article is the question of
when the interests of landowners of oil or gas producing lands can
be included in a unit operation with the lands of neighboring
owners. The interest in question is usually a royalty interest, although a mineral interest could be in issue.1 Often the landowner's
interest is spoken of as being "pooled". This is a term descriptive
of the legal consequence which results from a unitization of the
properties. For example, when it is said that the interests of landowners included in a unit are "pooled" we mean that each land1 Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d
914 (1952).
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owner in the unit has a right to share in production from any well
in the unit, regardless of the ownership of the tract on which it
is actually bottomed. This pooling of interests can take place
either by operation of law,2 or by agreement of the parties, i.e.
contract,8 which takes form as the unitization provision in an oil
and gas lease.
Under present consideration is the problem of when, in point
of time and condition of development, a developer, hereafter
referred to as a lessee, can pool the interests of the mineral
owners or lessors. The problem includes the question of formation of production units both during and after the expiration of
the primary term as stated in the oil and gas lease. It also includes
the question of unitizing both before and after production has
been obtained on the established or proposed unit.4
The question divides itself into three parts: unitization during
the primary term stated in the lease and before production has
been obtained upon the lease; during the term but after production
has been obtained; and, finally, after the stated primary term has
expired, but while the lease is still in effect due to drilling or
production on the lease itself or upon a tract of land which is part
of a unit in which all or a part of the lease in question
is included.
The solution to the problem will be governed by the terms of
the contract as evidence of the intent of the parties, lessor and
lessee, at the time of the agreement. Therefore, the answer to our
problem lies in contract interpretation. However, the plain language of the contract will necessarily be interpreted in accordance with the well established principles of oil and gas law. The
basic issue upon which most oil and gas law is based is the question of who is to share in the production from a particular well,
and to what extent will they be allowed to share.5 Before the
2 Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ refused; French v.
George, 159 S.W. 2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ refused.
s This contract usually takes the form of a so called unitization clause in the oil
and gas lease. However, it can take the form of a subsequent agreement, Grimes v.
LaGloria Corp., 251 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
4 The problem will be approached from the standpoint of voluntary unitization as
distinguished from compulsory unitization. Also, the emphasis will be placed largely
upon Texas decisions.
5 SHANK, PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW OF CAPTURE, THE SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION

258 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1953).
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to effect a pooling of interests under a unitization
oil and gas lease can be scrutinized, it will first be
acquaint ourselves with the principles of pooling
of law, as well as a few basic principles of oil and

POOLING OF INTERESTS BY OPERATION OF LAW OR BY AN IMPLIED
PROVISION IN THE OIL AND GAS LEASE

Under consideration now is an oil and gas lease which does not
contain a unitization provision. 6 In interpreting this contract, the
law of capture, 7 the doctrine of non-apportionment, 8 and the incidents of a joint or community lease,9 must constantly be kept in
mind. The courts frequently start an opinion by stating that it is
their purpose to construe the contract as written so that it will
most nearly reflect the intention of the parties at the time it was
executed by them. However, they will proceed to impress upon
the words of the parties a heavy gloss of court made law of which
it is highly doubtful that many lessors have the slightest knowledge. A large amount of this court-made law will be referred to
as "rules of property" and "not to be departed from"."
Before further progress can be made it will be* necessary to
make a short survey of a few of these judicial doctrines."
(a) The Law of Capture 12
Reduced to its purest form, the law of capture states simply
that any person who has the right to drill a well has a right to
produce from it as much oil and gas as he can. The rule was
announced in such early cases as Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt " and Barnard v. Monogahela Gas
Company " and has been under attack since that time. 5 At the
6 There is no such thing as a "standard" oil and gas lease, but the lease under consideration will be assumed to have an "unless" clause, and a five-year primary term.
7 Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 At. 801 (Sup. Penn.
1907).
s Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925) adopted.
9 Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d
914 (1952).
10 In re Southland, supra note 12.
11 The following analysis is by no means intended to be exhaustive, and the reader
is referred to more extensive works upon the subjects in the footnotes.
12 Shank, op. cit. supra note 5, 257.
is 130 Pa. 235, 18 At. 724 (1889).
14 216 Pa. 362, 65 At. 801 (1907).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

time the rule was announced it was a rule of necessity, the reason
behind it being the complete lack of knowledge of the subterranean
structures and the true nature of oil and gas. Since the time of its
entrance into oil and gas law the reason for the rule has, in fact,
largely disappeared, but the rule remains, which is the important
point here. The courts have sought to control the harshness of
the rule through the doctrine of correlative rights adjustment 17
and the legislatures have done likewise under their inherent police
powers for purpose of conservation and adjustment of correlative
rights."8
Another basic rule that should be kept in mind is the doctrine
of ownership in place.' 9 That is that the owner of the mineral
interest is deemed to own the minerals in place or in the ground
until he is divested of such ownership by the law of capture.

(b) The Doctrine of Non-Apportionment 20
This rule was first announced in the Texas Courts in the case of
Japhet v. McRae.2 .4 had given an oil and gas lease on tracts
No. 1 and No. 2. Subsequently, while the lease was still in force,
A sold tract No. 1 to B. A producing well was then brought in on
tract No. 2. B sued for a portion of the royalty. The court held
that the entire royalty went to A, the man upon whose land the
well was located. This case is said to stand for the proposition that
royalties will not be apportioned in Texas where an "entirety
clause" 22 is not in a common lease. That is, once it is established
15 However, it is still very much alive, as is evidenced by the latest Supreme Court
of Texas decision in Ryan Consolidated Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens- .........-S.W.2d-......
(Tex. Sup. Ct. on rehearing, 1955).
16 In re Ryan Consolidated, supra note 15.
17 Elif v. Texan Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette -........... Miss ......-- _ 72 So.2d 176 (1954).
18 The first case establishing the right of a state to do so was Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
19 Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290
(1923).
20 Walker, Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas in Texas During the War
Years-A Resume, 25 TEx. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1946).
21 Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925) adopted.
22 "A typical entirety clause reads as follows: 'If the leased premises shall hereafter
be owned severally or in separate tracts, the premises nevertheless shall be developed
and operated as one lease and all royalties accruing hereunder shall be treated as an
entirety and shall be divided among and paid to such separate owners in the proportion
that the acreage owned by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage.'" Hardwicke, Apportionment of Royalty to Separate Tracts: The Entirety Clause
and the Community Lease, 32 TEXAs L. REv. 660 (1954). For a full discussion, Hardwicke, op. cit. supra.

COMMENTS

19561

that a person has the right to drill, he has the right to all minerals
produced, absent an express provision to the contrary. However,
it should be kept in mind that in the Japhet case the actual situation was not that of a lease signed by both landowners describing
their combined tracts. Rather, the situation was one in which a
deed conveying part of a leased tract was executed in favor of a
grantee who was not a party to the lease contract, and such deed
did not make mention of any right to share in mineral production
on lands not conveyed in it. Nevertheless, a great number of
opinions have cited the Japhet case in controversies involving joint
and community leases and in controversies over the right to share
in production when it is impossible for a landowner to drill himself due to conservation statutes. At the very minimum, we must
keep in mind that the doctrine must be eliminated by contract
in order that there may be a pooling of interests.
(c) Incidents of a Joint or Community Lease 22
A joint or community lease is defined as one instrument describing the lands of a number of lessors, which is signed by each
of the lessors,2 4 or a number of identical leases describing the
lands of a number of lessors with each lessor signing only one of
the instruments.25 One would apprehend that if the court reasoned
in the Japhet case that there must be an express provision before
any pooling of lessors' interests could take place, this rule would
control as to other similar situations. However, in Parker v.
Parker26 it was held that if the landowners sign the same lease,
and such lease described their contiguous acreage, the landowners
would share prorata 27 in a well located upon the land described
in the lease, regardless of whose land it is actually located upon.
The court stated, "[t]he lease here in question, by its terms, is a
unitized lease as a matter of law." 28
In French v. George,29 the question was as to who was to share
23 HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION

(1954).

24 Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ refused.
25 Thomas v. Ley, 177 Okla. 150, 57 P.2d 1186 (1936).
28 See note 24 supra.
27 That is, the landowner shares in the royalty in proportion to the number of
acres that his land bears to the entire acreage of the community lease.
28 144 S.W.2d at 305.

29 159 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ refused.
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in the production from a well when the parties had signed a joint
lease. The court held that all the lessors who were a party to a
joint lease were to share in the production, regardless of where
the well was located on the leased premises. The court further
stated that in the absence of an express provision to the contrary,
such result must have been intended by the parties. The Japhet
case was cited to the court, but the court distinguished it upon the
basis that, "[i]t is not a question here of the legal rights of the
parties in the absence of a contract. It is a question of what they
intended by the provision which they inserted in the lease." 'o The
court reasons that in Japhet there was no contractual relationship
between the parties, while here there is a written contract signed
by all of the parties to the controversy.
These decisions stand today, and are frequently cited for the
proposition that lessors who sign the same instrument, and such
instrument describes their combined acreage, will have their
royalty interests pooled by operation of law. This means that a
lessor, who signs a lease, may in law intend more than is actually
spelled out in the contract because a pooling provision will be
implied in the lease. The cases indicate to the writer that there
exists a certain flexibility in lease interpretation which is in favor
of unitization of oil and gas lands.
A recent Texas Supreme Court decision, Southland Royalty Co.
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.," sets out by way of dictum a few
of the incidents of a joint lease, although it does not purport to
be exhaustive:
It must therefore be held that when the parties executed the lease in
1932 they intended to create a unitized lease with all of the usual
incidents and legal consequences thereof.
Some of the legal consequences of a unitized lease as between lessors
on the one hand and lessees on the other, in the absence of express

agreement to the contrary, are as follows:
(1) the life of the lease is extended as to all included tracts beyond
the primary term and for as long as oil, gas or other minerals
are produced from any one of the tracts included in the lease;
(2) the commencement of a well on any one of the tracts operates to
30 Supra note 29 at 569.
31

151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d 914 (1952).
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excuse the payment of delay rentals on all included tracts for the
period stated in the lease;

(3) production from a well on any one of the tracts relieves the
obligation to pay delay rentals, during production, on all included
tracts;
(4) the lessee is relieved of the usual obligation of an implied covenant
for reasonable development of each tract separately;
(5) wells may be located without reference to property lines;
(6) the lessee is relieved of the obligation to drill off-set wells on
other included tracts to prevent drainage by a well on one or more
32
of such tracts.

With the above doctrines of the law of capture, rule of nonapportionment, and the incidents of a joint lease in mind, we can
now proceed to analyze the possible rule as to when a lessee can
conduct unit operations upon lands which are held under leases
that do not contain unitization provisions.
In accordance with the law of capture, without anything more,
the entire royalty interest would go to the owner of the land on
which the well is located. The doctrine of non-apportionment tells
us that no one, at any time, may be allowed to share in this production without an express provision on the part of the owner.
However, if the lessor in question has originally signed a joint
lease, by operation of law, his interest will be pooled with those
of his co-lessors. Therefore, the life of the lease begins as a
unit. The unit was created in its entirety by all the parties before
there was any development on any of the lands, and the unit will
continue as long as there is drilling or production upon any part
of the lease in accordance with the lease. 88
As to the question of whether or not lands not originally included in the joint lease can be later unitized with all or a part
of the lands originally in the joint lease, and thereby increase
the size of the unit, the answer would seem to be that they could
not be so included without express consent of all the original
lessors. This conclusion seems only reasonable because the unit
is treated as a single entity for development and production pur32 Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., supra note 31, 249 S.W.2d
at 916.
33 Payment of delay rentals on the entire joint lease will keep the lease in effect
during the five-year primary term.
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poses and the same situation would exist if there were only one
lease and one lessor involved, in which case the lessor's royalty
interest could not be pooled without his express consent. The
validity of the unitizing effect of a joint lease is not completely
above serious challenge,84 so it would follow that the courts will
not extend the effect of a joint lease to include a right on the part
of the lessee to further dilute the interest of the lessor without the
permission of all the lessors. There is one line of cases that would
seem to indicate this result,"5 although they are not directly upon
the point.
POOLING OF INTERESTS BY EXPRESS PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT

When, in point of time and development, can the lessee pool
the royalty interest of the lessor, when the lessee is given the right
to do so by an express provision in the contract? The clause which
we will assume has been added to the "standard" oil and gas
lease is called a "unitization provision". Of course, there is no
such thing as a standard "unitization provision," because such
a clause in the contract will necessarily be modified to conform
with the peculiar size and structure of the land in question and
the varying bargaining positions of the parties. For the purpose
of this article it will be assumed that the provision allows the
lessee to unitize all or any portion of the lease with contiguous
neighboring tracts in order to form oil or gas producing units of
a definitely determined acreage. 6 Further, the provision is assumed to provide that production or drilling on any part of the
unit so formed shall be considered production or drilling upon
all lands included in such unit, and it shall be so considered for
all purposes. In addition, the lease states that the lessee has the
right to form such a unit or units, at any time. The royalty from
s4 In re Southland Royalty, supra note 31, 249 S.W.2d at 916 the court said, "It may
be noted here that respondents suggest a re-examination of the Parker and George
cases on the theory that the courts should not attribute to lessors jointly executing a
general form lease, without more, an intent to pool or unitize their properties; that
the language of the general form lease was never intended to effect or to operate as a
pooling agreement. This argument is not entirely unappealing. The Texas rule in this
respect is not of universal application ....
On the other hand, the law of the Parker
and George cases has now become a rule of property in this state..
85 Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So.2d 21 (1953).
s6 Assume 640 acres for a gas producing unit, and 40 acres for an oil producing unit.
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the producing wells is shared by the members of the unit in pro.
portion to the number of acres they contribute to the entire unit.
(1)

The Power to Pool Before Production

This phase of the question has, in contemplation, the ability of
the lessee to form production or drilling units before production
has been obtained upon the lease in question.
Naturally, since this is exactly what the lease provides for,
it is obvious that such can be done. In addition, since a great
number o; unitization clauses provide that the lease may be included in one or more units, it is conceivable that portions of the
lease could be included in a number of separate production units.
Question would seem to arise only when the lessee fails to fulfill
the express and implied conditions which are impressed upon him
under the lease. For example, the lessee might be sued for damages, on some theory of fraud, where an unusually small amount
of his acreage is included in a very large unit. The effect of this
would be to give the small contributor to the unit a very small
portion of the royalty while at the same time excusing the lessee
from paying delay rentals and adequately developing the lessor's
remaining land. There are no cases precisely on point, but it is
believed that the acts of the lessee would have to be quite shocking since he is doing precisely what the lease states that he has a
right to do. (After the stated primary term has expired other
factors, to be discussed later, might give rise to an action for
cancellation of the unpooled portion.) Also, the lessor might
complain that he has been pooled with a worthless tract, but
here again, he will find it difficult to tell the court wherein he has
been harmed during the stated primary term. An Oklahoma case,
Thomas v. Ley,37 says that the pooling must be done within a
"reasonable time." A recent Louisiana case, although not completely upon the point, would seem to indicate that the courts of
that state will not look with favor upon an "eleventh hour"
pooling. 8
177 Okla. 150, 57 P.2d 1186 (1936).
38 Wilcox v. Shell Oil Company, 226 La. 417, 76 So.2d 416 (1954).
37
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(2) The Power to Pool After Production but Before the End of
the Primary Term
This issue contemplates two situations. One situation exists
where there is a producing well on the lease in question, and the
lessee attempts to unitize all or the producing part of the lease
with other lands. The next situation arises where an operating
unit, including more than one lessor's land, is sought to be
changed or redesignated by the lessee so as to include the same
number of acres, but different lands than those in the original
operating unit.
The Oklahoma court considered the first situation, under modified circumstances,39 in the case of Gilham v. Jenkins.4" Production had been obtained during the primary term upon the lessors'
land in the form of a gas well. World War II was in progress at
the time and federal government regulations permitted gas production from units of 160 acres or larger. The lessor's land consisted of only around 80 acres. The lease gave to the lessee the
right to form units with the land, and stated that the lease was
subject to any state or federal regulations. Under the authority
of the right given by the lease, the lessee proceeded to pool the
producing property with a neighboring 80-acre tract in order that
the gas might be marketed. The lessor brought suit, claiming that
the lessee had no right to pool his royalty interest after production
had been obtained. The lessor relied heavily upon an earlier
decision, Imes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co.41 In its holding the
court cited and distinguished the Imes case and Thomas v. Ley. 2
It went on to say, "a real necessity and purpose existed at the
time of the pooling, which was done in good faith to obtain the
marketing of the gas from the well on the plaintiff's land and,
where the unitization was had, under compulsion, if the gas was
to be marketed and benefit obtained by either party." The court
further said that from the circumstances of the times, and with an
eye to the intent of the parties at the time of execution of the lease,
the lessee had a duty to act as he did. Possibly, the peculiar circumstances surrounding this litigation should encourage us not
-9 Strict Federal regulations were in effect at that time, due to World War II.
40 206 Okla. 440, 244 P.2d 291 (1952).
41 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
42In
re Imes, supra note 41; 177 Okla. 150, 57 P.2d 1186 (1936).
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to take all the language in this case too seriously, but when it
is compared with decisions in closely related situations, it is clear
that the lessee is safe in unitizing the land on which there is
already production, provided that he is not attempting to perpetrate a fraud or violate any of his contractual duties to the lessor.
The lines case4" furnishes an excellent example of a situation
where the lessee attempted to go too far in joining additional
acreage with a producing unit. In that case, there had been a unit
designated, and production had been obtained upon that unit.
There was a provision in the lease that allowed the lessee to join
other lands in order to form production units, and to do so at
any time, and without the consent of the lessors. The lessee attempted to do so (and before the stated primary term had elapsed).
The court said that it would be unfair to allow those who had taken
no risk " to participate in the benefits of a proven venture. The
court further went on to hold that the lessee was acting in bad
faith toward the original lessors because the land sought to be
joined was of proven worthlessness. A good many of these opinions
purport to base their holding upon the good or bad faith of the
lessee in doing the acts complained of when the true issue is a
question of contract rights. Therefore, in the Imes case the actual
holding is probably that the lessee does not have a contract right
to deliberately diminish the royalty interest of the lessors when
there is no benefit to any party to the contract but rather to a
group of outsiders who assumed none of the risk of the venture.
In a recent federal case, Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries,"'
the court held that the lessee was within his contract right to pool
after production had been obtained, and a few months prior to
the expiration of the primary term.4 6
Trawick v. Castleberry "7considers the question of whether a
producing portion of a lease which is already entirely included in
a unit can be carved out of that unit and placed in a second producing unit. The entire lease upon which a gas producer was
located had been unitized. Later, the well became an oil producer,
43 In re Imes, supra note 41.
44 The court was referring here to the proposed lessors.
45 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
'46 The court stated that the lessee was in "good faith."

-T .Okla-..

275 P.2d 292 (1953).
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and the lessee created a new unit which included only a seven
acre tract from the 80 acre lease and the producing well was
located upon this tract. The lessor filed suit alleging that the lease
had expired due to the lessee's failure to diligently develop, and
that in any event the lease should be cancelled as to the nonunitized 73 acres due to the fact that the lessee was allowing it
to be drained. The court held for the lessee, saying that due to
the express provision of the lease, the primary term was extended
to the non-unitized as well as to the unitized portion of the lease.4"
The court pointed out, by way of dicta, that the redesignation of
the unit is of no consequence in so far as it was done within the
primary term.49
A Texas case connected with the subject is Grimes v. LaGloria.
The lessee attempted to create a second unit, excluding a portion
of the lessor's land that had been included in the first unit. The
court held that the lessee could not vary the lessor's royalty rights
as established by the first unit. However, in the unitization agreement signed by the lessor, there was a provision that stated that
a certain producing tract, which did not belong to the plaintiff,
was to be included in any unit of which the plaintiff's land was
made a part. Since this is such an unusual clause, and since the
lessee violated it in forming the second unit, the case probably
is restricted to its own facts. At any rate, the court purported to
hold that the number of acres included in a unit could not be
diminished, but the number could be increased by the inclusion
of neighboring lands up to the maximum number of acres specified in the lease for the particular producing unit in question. 5
It is difficult to generalize upon the above cases without a prohibitive amount of qualification. With strict reference to that
period stated in the lease to be the primary term, we can conclude
that the lessee has the right to form production units, using part
or all of the lease in question. The lessee can do this both before
and after production has been obtained, provided that he does so
within a reasonable time, and that he does not do so in fraud of
48 The court here had reference to the provision in the lease which stated that production on any part of a unit would be considered production on the lease.
49 The significance of this statement will be considered later in the comment when
the problem of pooling after the expiration of the stated primary term is considered.
50 251 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
51 In re Grimes, supra note 50, at 760.
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any rights of the lessor. Likewise, it would seem that he would
modify an established unit as to size and shape. In all events, the
particular lease in question is the controlling instrument and the
lessee's acts cannot be in violation of its express or implied conditions or covenants.
(3) The Power to Pool After the Primary Term
Finally, can the lessee unitize part or all of the lease in question after the primary term?
Before going further, the nature of the unitization provision
should be briefly inquired into. There is some controversy as to
whether the formation of a unit by the lessee is a conveyance of
land, or simply the execution of a contract right which gives to
the lessor the right to share in the production of a well located on
the unit of which his land is a part. Under Texas law, the pooling
clause is considered a cross-conveyance of realty.5 2 Possibly it is
more logical to reason that a mere contract right to share in the
production is all that is actually in issue.5" Even in jurisdictions
where the clause is considered a conveyance, the rule against
perpetuities has not as yet been held to have a fatal effect upon
such conveyance." A Kansas case affords an excellent example
of this.5" The facts of the case were that the plaintiff owned two
tracts of land. The tracts were leased to the defendant, and the
instrument contained a unitization agreement of a common form.
The defendant-lessee formed one unit, in which was included one
of plaintiff-lessor's tracts. Lessee then formed a second unit which
included the remaining tract, A producer was brought in on the
plaintiff's tract which was included in the second unit, and the
plaintiff refused to accept his acreage proportionate share to which
he was entitled under the terms of the second unit. Instead, the
plaintiff-lessor brought suit for the full royalty. The plaintiff con52 Miles v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 241 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error
refused
n.r.e.

53 Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
54 For a full discussion of the rule against perpetuities with respect to oil and gas
leases, Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on PerpetualNon-Participating Royalty and Kindred Interests, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 369 (1954).
See also, Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek, 248 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952);
Knight v. Chicago Corporation, 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564 (1945) ; Leach v. Brown,
251 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) writ refused; Boggess v. Milam, 127 W. Va. 654,
34 S.E.2d 267 (1945).
55 Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952).
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tended that the rule against perpetuities was violated by the unitization clause in the lease, and that, therefore, the clause was
wholly invalid. The court said:
The lease does not create any future estates. The rights of the parties
thereunder are definitely fixed, and all estates and rights created by it
vested immediately upon its execution and delivery. It granted to
lessee the right to operate the lands covered by it separately or as a
part of a consolidated unit. The royalty provisions fit either operation
and provide a formula by which the amount of royalties payable to
the lessor is capable
of accurate and definite ascertainment. These
56
rights were vested.
Another difficult problem which arises when the unitization
provision is considered to be a conveyance of land is that of
parties to any litigation." No attempt will be made to go into this
any further than to observe the possible difficulty which will result
when a title suit is brought that concerns land included in a unit
in which there are a large number of royalty and mineral owners. 8
The Kenoyer case " raised another question of importance here.
The plaintiff contended that due to the indivisible character of
an oil and gas lease, the lessee could not place portions of his
land in two different units.6" However, the court held that the
placing of the lease into two different production units did not
divide the lease. This, of course, is true, because the lease will
stand or fall in its entirety regardless of how many units it is
included in for production purposes. A late case pointing this out
is Buchanan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. 6 ' The issue in that case was
whether production on a unit, which included a small portion of
the plaintiff's lease, would keep in effect the lease on the nonunitized portion. The court held that under the facts and circumstances of that particular case, such production did perpetuate
the entire lease. However, the court limited their holding by the
following remarks:
56 In re Kenoyer, supra note 55, 245 P.2d at 179. As authority for its holding, the
court quoted from 41 AM. JuR., Perpetuitiesand Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 22, 23.
57 Dedman, Indispensable Parties in Pooling Cases, 9 Sw. L. J. 27.
1s Leach v. Brown, 251 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) writ refused.
59 Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952).
60 That a lease is indivisible is also the law in Texas, Grimes v. LaGloria, 251 S.W.2d
755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
81218 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1955).

COMMENTS
What and all that the district judge determined, and adjudged, all that
we hold and adjudge in affirming his judgment, is that, under the undisputed facts, drilling on, and production from, the unit well has kept,
and is keeping, the lease in force against the claim that because there
is no production from the lands described in lease No. 377, the lease
has by its own terms expired or terminated. Nothing in the district
judge's holding or judgment, nothing in our affirmance of it, justifies,
authorizes, or will permit appellee to hold the unitized portion of the
lease against well-founded legal claims, of abandonment or for damages
for breach of the implied covenants, or, where there is no other adequate relief, against well-founded claims, for relief in equity.
Thus, the court indicates by way of dicta that in a proper case

it might declare a portion of a lease to have been abandoned. However, it should be noted that this has not been done. 2
By way of summary, we can say that the unitization provision does not violate the rule against perpetuities, whether it be a
conveyance or not. Also, the exercising of the unitization provision
by including the lessor's land in two or more units does not effect
an unlawful division of an oil and gas lease. The Buchanan case"3
holds that under the circumstances the lease is kept in effect, at
least during the primary term, by the production on a unit which
includes part of the lease. The Trawick case 6 seems to say that
there is a right on the part of the lessee to reform his units, at least
during the primary term, regardless of whether production has
been obtained on the lease in question. Therefore, if authority can
be found for the proposition that the primary term is extended by
production for all purposes, it would be logical to assume that the
lessee in a proper case can unitize beyond the primary term.
02 That is, there are no cases which have allowed a partial cancellation of a lease.
However, in the Buchanan case, 218 F.2d at 441, the court states, "This is not to say, as
seems to have been thought in Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, ... to be the case,
that this court and the Supreme Court of Texas, in so holding, have in effect held that
'the production from such unit well' (would) 'keep the lease in force indefinitely as to
the leased land without the unit' (and) 'the lessor would be deprived of the right to drill
on the leased land without the unit and deprived of any royalties, rentals, or benefits
therefrom.' The exact contrary of this has been held in Texas Company v. Davis, 113
Tex. 321, 331, 254 S.W. 304, 255 S.W. 601, . . . and the host of cases following ...
where it has been pointed out (1) estate acquired by ... lessee ... is a determinable
fee... lost on cessation of use...; (2) . . . estate will not survive abandonment;
(3) the lessee ... remained, subject to ... development ... with reasonable diligence;
and (4) and (5) breach of implied covenant will not authorize forfeiture . . . a court
will, under extraordinary circumstances, entertain an action to cancel the lease in
whole or in part."
e Supra note 61.
Okla-------------275 P.2d 292 (1953).
64 Trawick v. Castleberry ...........
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The case of Scott v. Pure" appears to be very material
on this point. A large portion of a lease was unitized during the
primary term, and production was obtained upon this unit,
although not on the specific tract of land in question. After the
stated primary term had expired," the remaining portion of the
lease was included in another unit. Scott contended that the lease
terminated as to the portion pooled after the primary term due to
the fact that there was no production upon that particular tract
itself, and that it was not pooled with a producing unit before the
expiration of the primary term. (Note that Scott is urging that his
lease is divisible.) The court in its holding stated:
...where a portion of the whole leased acreage is rightfully unitized
production in paying quantities during the primary term of a gas
and oil lease, although not from a well on such leased property, maintains the lease in effect 67as to that part of the leased land which is
not included in the unit.

Thus, the court allows the lessee to pool a portion of the land
after the expiration of the primary term. This was not the sole
point of the case, but it appears to be a necessary incident to
the holding. The court stated, with regard to the point we are
considering:
The "land covered" by the lease was the entire 317.93 acre tract,
"any portion" of which it was agreed might be unitized .... To construe this language to mean that only that portion of the acreage
actually pooled or unitized would be affected by the production of gas
from the unit would be to disregard the phrase "for all purposes"
which is contained in the provision, and would effect a reformation
of the contract to include an exception which was not placed in the
agreement by the parties, and which is not implied by the language
used, and moreover, one which is repugnant to the existing contract.6s

In Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,6 9 after
the Texas Supreme Court had enumerated some of the incidences
of a joint lease7" they went on to say:
65194 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952).
66 10-year primary term.
67 Supra note 65 at 395.
68 See note 65 supra.
69 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d 914 (1952).
70 Supra note 69 at 916.

1956]

COMMENTS

There is no sound reason to hold that the agreement had the operative
effect solely for the purposes heretofore noted; in 71the absence of
express agreement it had that effect for all purposes.

It is submitted that the above cases support the conclusion that
the lessee has the contract right to further unitize a lease when the
primary term of that lease has been extended by production upon
the lease itself or production upon a unit which includes a part of
the lease in question. When a lessee sets out to determine whether
he has this right, he should consider whether or not he is acting
within a reasonable time, remembering the limitation placed upon
the "at any time" phrase used in the lmes7" contract. He must
further consider the venture rule stated in that case. Also, he
should consider the possibility that his lessor's rights have become
static under the terms of the particular agreement.7" He must
always consider the possibility that some appellate court might
come to the conclusion that the unitization clause is a violation of
the rule against perpetuities, 74 due to the fact that a conveyance of
reality is the result of the provision. Above all, the lessee should
anticipate all of these possible pitfalls in his original lease.
Louis P. Bickel.

71 See

note 70 supra.

Imes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
7' Such as in Grimes v. LaGloria, supra note 50.
74 Today, many lessees expressly state in the lease that the unitization agreement
will have no operative effect in violation of the rule against perpetuities.
72

